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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of how
South African economic actors react to the gradual entry of non-
South African BRICS ﬁrms in their established business areas.
Throughout the twentieth century, South Africa’s trade and invest-
ment activities were conducted overwhelmingly with Western
countries. However, the end of apartheid coincided with signiﬁ-
cant shifts as new players had a wider and growing presence.
South Africa entering the BRICS alliance is symbolic of the change.
Ease of entry into the South African economy has increased
greatly. South African businesses in key subsectors in the mining
and capital equipment industry have had to adapt to new players,
and ﬁnd space in new structures, value chains and initiatives. This
paper presents the results of this research activity from the per-
spective of the South African political economy. Practice-oriented
research investigated how six local companies forge new partner-
ships and how well South African ﬁrms adapt and cope with an
altered and often unstable environment. It assumed that entrepre-
neurial activity is not autonomous but takes place within a larger
organisational framework. Entrepreneurial activity facilitates the
eﬀective exploitation of particular niches and relationships with
service providers.
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1. Introduction
In 2018, BRICS as a formal association of four/ﬁve emerging economies (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa, since 2011) enters its second decade of existence. The
10th BRICS Summit, an annual diplomatic meeting, is due in Johannesburg. South
Africa is also ﬁnalising its preparations to take over the rotating leadership of the BRICS
group for the second time in 2018. Following his election, the country’s new President,
Cyril Ramaphosa annouced his will to strengthen relations between South Africa and
other members of the BRICS alliance.
In The Rise of the BRICS in Africa, Pádraig Carmody, a development geographer, argues
that ‘South Africa accommodates global and regional power interests on the continent,
making it a “gregional” state and power’ (Carmody 2013). The notion of a gregional power
conﬁguration exempliﬁes South African elites’ aspirations in the way the country ‘serves as
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which should be cited to refer to this work.
a transmission belt for global forces to the rest of the continent’. This is key to grasping
where the South African economy is positioned in the grand discussion over BRICS. After
exploring the diverse interests and strategies of players from the individual BRICS nations,
Carmody (2013) notes that South African interests in fact bolster Chinese big businesses’
activities in Africa with impacts that remain unclear. The purpose of this paper is to
improve our understanding of how South African economic actors react to the gradual
entry of non-South African BRICS ﬁrms in their established business areas.
Carmody does not deﬁne the particular role of South African companies in the
BRICS process (Draper and Qobo 2015). In addition, it is not clear how governments
politically engaging in BRICS would promote more value-added exports and attract
investment in minerals beneﬁciation or processing at source as would be desirable
(Kaplan 2015). Instead, increased competition from BRICS ﬁrms, mainly with those
from India and China, has become a practical challenge for many ﬁrms, notably in
manufacturing (Kaplan 2015; Manufacturing Circle 2017). An understanding of how to
engage economically with non-South African BRICS actors is pertinent for policy
makers and private ﬁrms (Qobo 2010; Draper and Qobo 2015). In her criticism of
suspect state-business relations, Catherine Grant Makokera (2015, 127) advances the
argument earlier made by Qobo (2010) on the
‘. . .need for the public and private sectors in South Africa to work together in order to
develop further the economic diplomacy of the country. There is a clear potential to
mutually agree on an approach that is both supportive of the economic development of the
African continent and protective of the assets and access to proﬁts of the South African
business community’ (Grant Makokera 2015).
In other words, how do South African ﬁrms succeed or fail with their strategies of
internationalisation against increased international competition (Barnes and Morris
2008; Morris and Barnes 2014; Verhoef 2011)? The present study explores novel
inter-ﬁrm cooperation practices and examines how the activities of economic actors
from the other BRICS members ﬁt into the contemporary South African economy. The
study could reveal neglected factors in what is often described as a rush for resources in
sub-Saharan Africa or in the contested international market for capital goods and
services. Moreover, there has been little academic attention devoted to the question
of how a BRICS strategy inﬂuences South African economic policies (Çakir and
Kabundi 2017; Draper and Qobo 2015) or on how enterprises engage in competitive
or collaborative economic practices.
We consider the salience of new and still largely bilateral engagements and their
eﬀects on South Africa’s economic transition. This calls for a study of practices and
meso-level eﬀects rather than purely macroeconomic factors. Here, we can combine
studies of inter-linking in a post-Western world order globally with organisational
studies of inter-ﬁrm relationships, where the stable hierarchies (Chandler 1977) once
described have often tumbled. This study focuses on what we identify as entrepreneurial
practices of South African managers, very diverse but separate from the very large
shareholder value-driven multinational South African companies (Verhoef 2011). These
multinationals (BHP Billiton, AngloGold Ashanti, Sasol or MTN) seek the attainment
of economic goals through ‘go-it-alone diplomacy’ in which ‘ﬂag follows trade’
(Valsamakis 2012).
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Our conceptual foundation does not concentrate on the macro issues of inter-BRICS
economic relationships and their eﬀects on development processes in Africa but rather
on a meso-level where socio-economic linkages and collaboration are exercised.
Emerging questions include asking how the diverse private businesses perceive their
role in South Africa’s aspiration to become a gateway for non-South African BRICS
business partners and investors into Africa. What does it mean to maintain a compe-
titive advantage in such an environment and to create valuable and sustainable syner-
gies? Which kind of power relations would be acceptable to South African executive
teams in pursuit of what BRICS state elites have often casually labelled a ‘win-win
partnership’? Where are the African voices? Are the business voices the same as the
government ones?
Researchers from the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa in Stellenbosch have
suggested that both South African diplomatic and business elites hoped that the BRICS
process would be practically beneﬁcial with new opportunities of expanding and
diversifying export markets. State actors hoped that it would be supportive to broader
economic growth. The South African economy was expected to attract investment in
local minerals beneﬁciation or processing (and job creation at source), and in turn new
greenﬁeld investments beyond mere portfolio speculations. Business executives antici-
pated chances of promoting value-added exports into new markets in the prospering
BRICS. They hoped that the high entry barriers to imports from non-South African
BRICS countries would also be lowered for BRICS partner ﬁrms (Fundira 2011; Sandrey
and Jensen 2012).
The following focal questions guided the ﬁeld research on strategies and practices in
a carefully selected group of six South African corporations in the mineral resources
supply chain. How do such corporate executive teams1 rethink strategies for corporate
development in a rapidly changing global environment speciﬁcally shaped by the
opening up of the economy post 1994, the non-South African BRICS countries’
increased engagement on the African continent via South Africa, and the volatility of
the mineral resources industry? In what way then do teams of South African corpora-
tions implement their strategies and perform practices in this context?
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Ethnographic research method
Economic geography can contribute to the demarcation and deepening of our under-
standing of ‘agency’ and identifying essential practices that manifest at the inter-ﬁrm
level (Jones and Murphy 2011). A relational practice-orientated approach developed in
this discipline was adopted when analysing the perspectives of the South African
economic actors. Instead of focussing on individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneuri-
alism, this study’s investigation embraced teams. The focus was on identifying repeated
but improvised social practices that can result in desired economic outcomes in space
and time. The key factor is the direct link or links between the practices under study,
their outcomes, and their socio-economic meanings. As ‘practice remains a rather loose
and literal idea’, Jones and Murphy (2011, 376) propose the use of ‘practice’ for ‘. . .
eﬀectively conceptualizing the relationship between, on the one hand the signiﬁcance
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and meaning of micro-social actions and, on the other, larger-order structures, such as
institutions, social class or culture’. The eﬀects, they argue, can be proﬁtable, although
not necessarily stable, outcomes. The causal practices specify meaning through their
eﬀects. Eﬀects such as infrastructure improvement, improved competitiveness, synergic
innovation, attractiveness to partners, and power relations in buyer’s markets are
tangible and may be measured or observed within and beyond the ﬁrm.
It is precisely practices, arrangements and their signiﬁcant eﬀects (Jones and Murphy
2011; Schatzki 2006), which we can employ empirically to describe and understand
agency better. Practices involve multiple logics, which are potentially in conﬂict, about
what is at stake in the competition for valued desiderata (status, power, resources) in a
social ﬁeld. Agency here is not a synonym for practices but rather a speciﬁc capacity to
act or interact based on organisational memory, past experiences, and present and
future expectations of an executive team. Understanding particular power relations,
conﬂicts and hierarchies are preconditions for exercising eﬀective agency.
Ethnographic ﬁeld research methods, including in-depth interviews and non-parti-
cipatory observations were conducted using a multiple-case study. A purposive sam-
pling method covered the South African industrial sub-sectors, which form the
backbone of the transforming economy, and which hold considerable comparative
advantages in business on the African continent. The stable criteria applied in selecting
ﬁrms ranging from small to large, whose principal business location is Johannesburg,
were (1) at least two years in a business partnership with actors from other BRICS
nations, (2) a signiﬁcant interest in establishing or experience in attracting a share-
holder from the BRICS, (3) a signiﬁcant interest in continental African markets and (4)
agreement to participate in longitudinal research enquiries for at least two years. A
larger study (Wenzel Forthcoming) focusses on six private South African companies, as
described in Figure 1. Forty-seven focused narrative in-depth interviews supplemented
with informal discussions and observations were conducted with managers and oﬃcials
in the companies in Johannesburg from February to April 2013 and from January to
March 2014. These enabled an appraisal of what we characterise as entrepreneurial
situations including internal strategy meetings or negotiations with customers, suppliers
or potential partners for the purpose of creating joint ventures. Conﬁdentiality regard-
ing respondents’ and their ﬁrms’ identities was agreed with respect to the publication of
Case 1:
A junior platinum mining 
company.
Case 2:
A leading diversified mining 
company operating in iron ore, 
copper, nickel, chrome, coal 
etc.
Case 3:
A minerals freight and logistics 
company operating in chrome, 
manganese, and coal.
Case 4:
An engineering, procurement, 
construction and management 
(EPCM) provider.
Case 5:
An original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) (heavy 
vehicles) that supplies mining 
exploration and infrastructure 
construction companies.
Case 6: 
A components manufacturer 
(fastening systems) that 
supplies heavy industry and 
mining.
Figure 1. Six case studies of companies operating in diverse sectors of mining and manufacturing.
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data that would be sensitive to existing or potential competitors. The strength of the
data set lies in the level of detail in the information obtained. The methodology’s
objective was to ensure the transferability of the study to similar research contexts
rather than to generalise about the economy under study at present.
This paper presents detailed evidence from the ﬁrst three cases. Cases Four and Six
have been discussed elsewhere (Wenzel 2014, 2016). The three case studies presented
initially here function within what Fine and Rustomjee (1996) have termed a Minerals-
Energy Complex (MEC). This systematic orientation has remained dominant in con-
trast to economic mixes that might emphasise building domestic markets, producing
consumer goods or competing internationally for exports. We adopt this perspective
and describe systematic agency within its conﬁnes.
3. Results
3.1. The South African economy in transition: new volatility in mining and BRICS
players
‘South Africa can no longer rely on being the default entry point for foreign investment
into the African continent. Now, more than ever, there is a unique opportunity to secure
signiﬁcant economic transformation’ (Manufacturing Circle 2017, 6).
This paper explores how South African entrepreneurial teams cope with a rapidly
shifting and challenging economic environment through an ethnographic research
process using terms that have become signiﬁcant recently for the discipline of economic
geography. However, before discussing the research and its conclusions, we consider in
this section some key aspects of that environment.
3.1.1. Stable oligopolistic power relations in the past
Throughout the twentieth century, South Africa’s trade and investment relationships
were predominantly with Western countries, particularly Britain. This reﬂected eco-
nomic power in the world as well as South Africa’s colonial history. Afrikaner nation-
alists were eager to reduce British inﬂuence. They also strongly supported the drive,
already evident in the last premiership of J.C. Smuts, to develop heavy industry via the
creation and development of parastatals. As mines-related capital on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE) was British oriented, the parastatals relied partially on loans from
European banks during the heyday of apartheid.
South Africa’s exports were dominated by gold; it was the source of most of the so-
called free world’s supply of gold. After the Bretton Woods Agreement was signed in
1944, the price of gold was eﬀectively stable and predictable. The South African
industry expanded based on a protected home market and was dominated by oligopo-
lies in major lines of business, which created a basis for stable and considerable growth
ﬁgures (Gelb 1991, 4). This stability lent itself to the replication of familiar structures
and a growing bureaucratisation of management-led capitalism. Thus, it was similar to
corporate structures in the major capitalist countries, starting with the USA. Alfred
Chandler, following in the footsteps of writers such as Coase and Berle, highlighted a
‘managerial revolution’ where a hierarchical, professionally trained bureaucracy made
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the key decisions in a predictable and structured way for an economy dominated by big
corporations (Chandler 1977).
In 1970, South Africa exported 1000 tonnes of gold, an unprecedented high point.
However, not long afterward, the global economy began to change in ways that were
unfavourable and unpredictable. South Africa’s economy lurched into a crisis through-
out the 1980s with ‘stagnation in output growth; inﬂation entrenched at over 13% per
annum; a weak rand; a permanent decline in foreign exchange reserves; and historically
low personal savings ratio’. This resulted in a legacy of economic problems in the 1990s
(Gelb 1991, 1).
3.1.2. South Africa’s transition in relation to BRICS growth
With the end of apartheid, the South African state moved to privatise and open up the
economy very dramatically (Freund 2013; Terreblanche 2012). Ease of entry into the
South African economy has increased greatly; old economic partners and investors have
either withdrawn or lost dynamism, as the case studies below will demonstrate. Twenty
years later, Gelb’s tone was more positive but with serious preconditions. In his view,
‘the core feature of our macroeconomic policy over the past decade and a half was
based on the implicit assumption that if we got high marks on ﬁnancial investors’ good
behaviour chart, we would be rewarded with high economic growth’ (Gelb 2010, 58).
However, this has proven untrue (Bhorat, Cassim, and Hirsch 2014; Black 2014; Hirsch
2005; STATSSA 2016).
The reasonable post-1994 recovery led to growth during the international boom in
minerals and other raw materials, notably feeding into spectacular Asian growth and
imports. However, after the 2008 crisis, ﬁgures showed instability and slow growth in
most years (STATSSA 2016). Between 1994 and 2012, the average growth of real GDP
reached 3.2%. South Africa’s real GDP for 2016 was nearly stagnant following sluggish
increases of 2.2% in 2013, 1.5% in 2014 and 1.3% in 2015. Current assessments suggest
that in 2017 only 1.3% was attained and the early estimates for 2018 actually proposed a
decline for at least the ﬁrst quarter. Domestic export production has remained com-
parably weak, undiversiﬁed and capital-intensive (Kaplan 2015; Makgetla 2011; Rodrik
2008). Critical writing has stressed the lack of skills, partly due to a brain drain, the
skewed structure of South African industry, and assessed overall sluggishness, notably
when compared to other middle-income economies (Kaplan 2015; Tregenna 2008).
One result is that industry itself has remained tied to domestic mining and energy
provision activities (Fine and Rustomjee 1996).
Yet sluggishness has been accompanied by considerable shifts in the business world.
The opening of the economy under these circumstances has also resulted in the
breakdown or reconstruction of the dominant economic linkages that prevailed in the
past. Finding new linkages or establishing them has become very critical. South African
businesses have had to adapt to new players and ﬁnd space in new structures, value
chains and initiatives. A consequence of this change has been the South African entry
into the BRICS alliance. In the past ﬁve years, the dynamism of BRICS has largely been
conﬁned to China and India, and even China is no longer growing at the breakneck
pace of a decade ago. Nevertheless, BRICS, as the hallmark of the present practice-
oriented investigation, is still relevant in the context of a changing global environment.
According to Bohler-Muller and Kornegay (2013, xxvi):
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Indeed, the original creation of the notion of a ‘BRIC’ grouping of emerging market
economies by Goldman Sachs, as an investment marketing ‘brand’ for asset fund managers,
had already given BRIC-turned-BRICS a level of proﬁle not shared by other non-Western
multilateral groups, such as IBSA for example. However, the political launching of the BRIC
forum as a revisionist reform vehicle for forging change in the global economic and ﬁnancial
architecture has elevated this Wall Street ‘branding’ to a new level that has attracted global
attention – and criticism (Bohler-Muller and Kornegay 2013).
Traders and end-users from China and the other BRICS members drove the commodity
super-cycle of the last decade. Tables 1 and 2 present statistics with regard to South
Africa in relation to other BRICS countries in 2016. The statistics display a highly
heterogeneous set of countries pursuing economic growth over the past three decades.
BRICS also alludes to the looming importance of South African enterprises in new
international value chains and to actual current issues that aﬀect it. South African
greenﬁeld investments remain the lowest in BRICS, especially low when compared to
China and Russia (Naudé, Szirmai, and Haraguchi 2015, 460–461). This is despite
highly favourable returns on capital invested in South Africa and a comparably open
economy (Bhorat, Cassim, and Hirsch 2014, 7). Yet South Africa retains signiﬁcant
interest from its BRICS partners. Currently, South Africa is the second-largest African
investment destination for China behind Nigeria. It has served as a gateway for Chinese
investment in Africa, especially in southern Africa (Mao 2017).
A closer look at relations with Asian players, in particular, reveals the South
African mining industry’s enduring signiﬁcance as well as its weaknesses. Let us
consider the big three items: gold, platinum and coal. South Africa’s Witwatersrand
Basin remains the world’s largest gold resource (Chamber of Mines 2016). Having
reached depths of 4,000 m, South African deep-level gold mines recorded the highest
production costs globally, with USD 1,035 per ounce in 2016, while the world
average was USD 818 per ounce (Statista 2018). Added to the challenge of potentially
Table 1. BRICS members’ individual macroeconomic performance in 2016.
GDP (million current
US$)
GDP per capita (US$,
2014–2016)
Current account
balance (% GDP,
2016)
Trade (% GDP,
2014–2016)
Brazil 1 798 622 9 874 −1.3 12.1
Russia 1 326 015 10 946 1.7 24.3
India 2 256 397 1 645 0.9 24.0
China 11 218 281 7 995 1.8 20.0
South
Africa
294 132 5 818 −3.3 31.2
Source: WTO.org, author compilation.
Table 2. BRICS members’ individual ranks in world trade in 2016.
Merchandise trade
exports Imports
Trade of commercial ser-
vices exports Imports
Share in world total
exports
Share in world total
imports
Brazil 25 28 32 21 1.2 0.9
Russia 17 24 25 18 1.8 1.2
India 20 14 8 10 1.6 2.2
China 1 2 5 2 13.2 9.8
SA 38 34 49 46 0.5 0.6
Source: WTO.org, author compilation.
?
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
?
unproﬁtable current gold prices are wage pressures and increased competitive inter-
national production. Table 3 illustrates how local gold production in metric tons has
signiﬁcantly declined since 2012, so that sales have fallen by 40%. Only about 5.3%
of the new worldwide supply was gold from South Africa by 2013 and the gold
sector’s contribution to the mining GDP has reduced considerably over the past
decade (Minerals Council 2018a). This South African trend diﬀers considerably from
other now larger gold producing countries,2 in particular China, which ranks at the
top. The new reality is that emerging players from China, Brazil and Russia have
increased their annual gold production since 2010. China and Russia are key rivals.
Anglo Gold Ashanti, the third largest producer in the world, is taking steps to
‘ensure the viability of our remaining operations’ according to a Johannesburg
spokesman. The mines face ‘systematic challenges’ including declining output,
increasing depth and cost escalations (Bloomberg, 2017). Yet, gold exports still
account for 17% of South African mineral export income.
South Africa holds the world’s largest known source of the six elements compris-
ing the so-called platinum-group metals (PGM) (Chamber of Mines 2016; Misra
2000). Large mining houses are ‘the majors of the sector, and responsible for
producing up to 80% of the world’s PGM supplies’ (Minerals Council 2018b).
However, Chinese companies have become the main traders and end-users. They
drove the latest boom in PGM prices and the consequent development of mines
from the mid-1990s. In the present study, the eﬀect of China’s expanding demand
for platinum on South African mining ﬁrms is very relevant. In contrast to the
decline in gold output by 63% between 1994 and 2009, a boom in PGM prices and
the associated mine development took oﬀ in the mid-1990s. By 2000, ‘the total sales
value of the PGMs eclipsed those of gold,’ indicating a switch to the ‘new dispensa-
tion’s primary export and leading mineral stock’ (Capps 2012, 78).
Coal also became a valuable export commodity from South Africa to China and
India during the recent commodity super-cycle when prices peaked between USD 130
and USD 140 per ton in 2011 (Chamber of Mines 2015). A 6% market share of global
exports puts South Africa sixth in the list of coal-exporting nations (Chamber of Mines
2016). Chinese demand has since fallen oﬀ as Chinese production expands. However,
new private power producers from India have increased demand for high-grade thermal
coal. India, therefore, became the largest importer of South African coal (35.1 million
metric tons and 46.6% of the total volume). The situation changed rapidly yet again as
dollar coal prices and export volumes fell in 2015 (Chamber of Mines 2015). Looking at
all three minerals, volatility with dramatic rapid price and demand shifts are being
accompanied by signiﬁcant BRIC partner activities as investors, customers and
competitors.3
Table 3. Selected BRICS-countries’ mines’ global production of gold from 2010 to 2017.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
SA 189 181 160 160 152 145 150 145
China 345 362 403 430 450 450 455 440
Brazil 58 62 65 71 80 81 80 85
Russia 192 200 218 230 247 242 254 255
Source: statista.com, author compilation.
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3.2. Shifting structures: the urgent need for new and clear-cut strategies
The changes in the external environment of the sample corporations have forced executive
teams to rethink their orientation towards their businesses’ critical future success factors and
thus, develop new strategies or rethink existing ones. In this process, corporations’ executive
teams deﬁne for themselves competitive advantages according to how they perceive the
interests, roles and powers of other players in future market developments. Deﬁning a clear-
cut strategy is thus based on the teams’ recognition of their increasingly unfavourable position
acting as price takers against strong end-users. Moreover, new conceptions push towards
stronger and better deﬁned collaboration with the new end-users in Asia generating condi-
tions for speciﬁc types of competitive agency (Wenzel Forthcoming).
Across the multiple case studies, the revised strategies can be grouped according to
their eﬀect on the companies’ survival. In reality, these strategies do not necessarily
stand alone but are interrelated (Figure 2). Longitudinal in-ﬁrm observations of strate-
gising during peak, mid and trough commodity cycles notably reveal that executives
have neither considered moderating proﬁt margins nor reducing employment. More
relevant to devising strategies, in particular with regard to adding value, are acute
shortages in appropriately skilled engineers able to act with entrepreneurial acumen,
as well as struggles with communication capacity often needed to engage with the new
actors from the other BRICS and create synergies from new forms of collaboration.
3.3. Shifting structures: BRICS players as new collaborators
To enter and grow presence and market share in new locations, the majority of South
African executives studied considered investors from non-South African BRICS
1) Growing shares in 
new markets
for existing products/ 
services through 
collaborative projects 
with international 
partners;  
2) Accompanying 
customers into new 
territories 
to maintain control through 
proximity and versatility to 
local demand and exploit 
future market potential of 
such territories;
3) Developing and 
strengthening value 
addition(after-sales) 
quality services in new 
markets as well as 
customer locations in 
order to achieve targets 
as described in 2)
4) Creating cost synergies
as a complementary 
strategic concept to better 
position the corporation for 
international price 
competition.
Figure 2. Four sets of strategies and associated targets to ensure survival of companies across the
multiple-case study.
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economies as potential alternatives to their customary Western partners. They began to
strategise and contemplate new mining projects once the sanctions era came to an end
and before the BRICS pact existed (Wenzel 2014; Wenzel, Graefe, and Freund 2013).
South Africa’s entry into the BRICS alliance in December 2010 was considered symbolic
rather than a step into the unknown.
Senior executives from Cases One and Two, both Johannesburg Stock Exchange
(JSE) listed minerals and metals producers, represented companies highly dependent
on both FDI and a stable international demand pattern and they acknowledged
increasing options to leverage long-term resource interests from other BRICS coun-
tries elsewhere in Africa. In Case One, an opportunistic rationale and resultant
survival strategy was pivotal in a very speciﬁc context and at a speciﬁc period in
the company’s life cycle. The founding executive team struggled to sustain a capital-
intensive platinum exploration project in the midst of the ﬁnancial crisis. The South
African team stuck with their plan to bring a junior platinum mine on stream that
was expected to employ more than 3,000 people. Initially, the well-timed ﬁnancing
strategy for investment had followed the model of ‘business as usual’ until the global
ﬁnancial crisis hit the Western economies:
. . .We had investors from all over the world. (. . .) And we were ahead of schedule,
about a year ahead of schedule and lower in budget. So technically it was a great project
and ﬁnancially it was a great project. And at that point the company got listed and was
about to go out and raise money on the international market. Then we got the
feasibility study in June of 2008. . .But there were bureaucratic problems in the
Department of Minerals and Resources. (. . .) There is no sense of urgency as to the
fact that you are trying to build a billion dollar mine and to bring it on stream and that
will employ 3.5 thousand people!
It was September 2008 when Lehman Brothers [folded]. . . it was game over. We still had
not been given our mine permit back. And so that cost us eﬀectively a billion dollars and
three years of delay in the project as a result. And when Lehmann Brothers collapsed, my
Western ﬁnance disappeared! Just evaporated! (Former senior executive, Case One mining
company, Johannesburg, Personal communication, April 2013).
The team then had to think outside the box to identify a reliable and feasible ﬁnancing
alternative:
(. . .) The way that the platinum market works is that about 90% of platinum mined is sold
on contract to Western (including Japan [sic]) companies. And 10% of the production is
sold on the spot market. And the Chinese who were the largest users of platinum were
reliant on buying their platinum on the spot market. There you have got a very, very
volatile pricing bearing in mind the relative high stability in Western contracts! (Former
senior executive, Case One mining company, Johannesburg, Personal communication,
April 2013).
The former senior executive of this company summarised what we term an ‘opportu-
nistic type of agency’ that leverages the conditions of high uncertainty. In this case, the
collapse of secure Western ﬁnance suppliers and shareholders led to negotiations with a
Chinese consortium resolved within a month:
And in October 2008 I got onto a plane and I went to China, to Beijing, and I started to
negotiate with the Chinese. The Chinese at that time had just passed the US as being the
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biggest world [automobile] manufacturer. They’ve subscribed to EURO5 environmental
emission standards [thus desiring platinum catalytic converters]. They have got huge
general environmental problems, they produce a very large part of the world’s LCD screens
and they have got a huge demand for jewellery. So as a market, China is signiﬁcant. . .
(Former senior executive, Case One mining company, Johannesburg, Personal commu-
nication, April 2013).
This visit to Beijing was a pioneering endeavour. It was an experiment in adjusting to
the structural order of platinum markets with the support of large eager clients. The
collaborative practices that followed in the coming years became possible due to a rapid
shift in strategy towards a strong end user (Wenzel Forthcoming). It was a new and
pragmatic ‘secure platinum supply’ strategy to ensure survival of the project. The actor
ﬁrst alerted members of the potential Chinese consortium about the situation and the
context of the emerging ﬁnancial crisis of 2008/2009. Chinese state-owned economic
actors, although accounting for the biggest platinum demand, had not yet become
dominant players in the ordering of the platinum markets. The team’s eﬀort to ﬁnd new
partners and investors resulted in the initiation of a new mine due to be commissioned
in 2018, two years earlier than projected. Case One exempliﬁed entrepreneurial meth-
ods for creating and actualising opportunities (Hjorth 2012; Sarasvathy and
Venkataraman 2011).
The executive team realised that they needed to anticipate abrupt changes to solve
problems as they sought suitable partners, whether clients, shareholders or govern-
ments. Most sought were Chinese (Yuan, Jayaram, and Kassiri 2017). Case One
demonstrates how ‘China’s presence provides alternatives to African nations minus
the traditional political interference of Western countries’ (Mao 2017). However, this
study reveals that they are not the only ones. ‘As more states such as India, Brazil and
others seek to gain inﬂuence on the continent, African countries are at an unprece-
dented position where their strategic options are better than at any time before’. Oﬀ-
take agreements thus created stability and much higher predictability in the demand
and supply pattern between the South African minerals producers and end users from
the non-South African BRICS.
In-depth interviews revealed how executive teams strategically select projects for new
mine development. Key success factors were the prevalence of the rule of law, for
example, the long-term security of ownership rights, and the availability of essential
infrastructure (planes, trains, ports, power supply and roads). In Case Two, the execu-
tive responsible for corporate development highlighted the context:
We’re not short of opportunities with BRICs partners, as they are the ones who are
knocking at our doors. We have a lot of approaches of Chinese and Indian ﬁrms who
want to become partners and to develop mines. . . and the Brazilians saw resources in
Africa as a big thing, especially copper. So they were aggressively looking for options in
South Africa in copper and to a certain extent in coal (Director, Case Two mining
company, Johannesburg, Personal communication, April 2013).
Notwithstanding new options, the ﬁrst thing for the executive team in Case Two was to
reduce risk: ‘Rio Tinto invested in Guinea. They have started the mining but they
cannot get their stuﬀ to the port because of a poor infrastructure’ (Director, Case Two
mining company, Johannesburg, April 2013). Although listed on the JSE, ﬁnancial
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matters were not taken directly into consideration at ﬁrst. The business model utilised
immediately focussed on achieving proﬁt:
Whether a country has temptingly great copper or gold to be mined, that’s just the beginning
of the whole process. The main thing is how you can get that to the market. . . We needed
somebody to help us to place our product; a marketing partner to place our product on the
market. . . (Director, Case Two mining company, Johannesburg, Personal communication,
April 2013).
A recurrent problem that emerged in interviews was the potential impermanence of
partner commitment and dynamism, notably when it came to new deep level mining
projects. In addition, it was crucial ‘to call the resources cycle correctly,’ not just
actualising high earnings during the upswing but also preparing for the inevitable
downswing. Feeding the bottom line required agency in the form of studying and
engaging with new marketing partners who would hopefully have strategic interests in
reliably securing products, conﬁrmed through willingness to sign oﬀ-take agreements.
The executive team in Case Two pursued a major transaction, ﬁrst acquiring a
further one-third of the company shares it lacked in 2009. This needed to be followed
by the creation of a 50:50 joint venture with the most suitable marketing partner. The
executive responsible for corporate development explained the process of selecting the
best ﬁt for concluding such a deal:
We did what is called a ‘beauty parade’. They [we] would send a letter to all the 40 mining
companies in the world to announce the interest to sell. They [the bidders] would then
communicate their interest in the deal. The list of interested companies is shortlisted to
seven companies. You’ll meet with them and then they would reduce the list to three
companies. You’ll continue discussions with them and reach an agreement. . . So if you
enter a process like that, it’s a journey of six months up to a year, where you’re selling your
shares and re-negotiating. In that process of time you get to know the other party and you
are either building or destroying trust. The fellow who’ll eventually win this process might
like you a lot in the end, because he considers the time he invested not as a waste. . .
(Director, Case Two mining company, Johannesburg, Personal communication, April
2013).
The process remained strongly tied to the search for a risk-averse corporate growth
strategy in the sense of ‘calling the resource cycle correctly’ to protect company assets
and employees’ jobs, beyond purely aiming at shareholder value. Evidence from the
interviews in Case Two suggests a pragmatic or opportunistic problem-solving strategy
(Hjorth 2012; Sarasvathy and Venkataraman 2011). How would the new partners deal
with low points in the price cycle? For the South African producer, ‘contribution to the
value chain in our partnership’ meant to preserve ‘control of the production operation’,
thus ‘driving the production processes up to a point where the product is sellable’
(Director, Case Two mining company, Johannesburg, April 2013). Beyond production,
cost competitiveness at all stages was an equally salient issue.
In an in-depth interview conducted one month after South Africa had successfully
hosted the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban, a director also stressed unpredictability and a
complex political environment within the BRICS:
As to strategy thinking within BRICS, sometimes one has to look at the level above. The
[Brazilian] government’s focus has shifted away to ask [our partner] to keep their money
??
??
??
???
??
??
??
??
??
?
and investments in their own country to create growth in Brazil. You cannot counteract in
the whole BRICS thing against what is government’s focus right now. So sometimes there
are overriding things that take you away from the BRICS idea. And that changes from
government to government, from CEO to CEO. And sometimes the markets change
(Director, CaseTwo mining company, Johannesburg, Personal communication, April
2013).
The quote exempliﬁes the complex political environment irrespective of individual
personalities changing at the top executive levels. With regard to the overriding drivers,
the key point from Case Two’s perspective was the ﬁnal validation of the South African
player’s own power base, which generated the executive team’s opportunistic but risk-
averse perception of the ‘BRICS idea’. The actual contingency, even the unpredictability
of governments’ agendas or of CEO’s agendas – in fact the unpredictability in the ‘win–
win’ preferences of relevant market actors – made the team cautious and aware of their
own priorities.
3.4. Negotiating power relations
In implementing their strategies, the six South African corporations studied sought
long-term arrangements with varied partners. South African executive teams assigned a
high value to negotiating preferred terms in such arrangements between individuals at
the top level. Yet, teams have to learn continuously and re-adapt their approaches as
they often experience limitations in capacity. Agency to act under uncertainty has to be
managed.
Various factors such as company size, ﬁnancial capacity, government support and
power relations between most of the South African and their potential BRIC partners
are unequal in favour of the BRIC side. Therefore, identifying appropriate stakeholders
as partners and negotiating agreements for long-term cooperation remain key chal-
lenges for the South African corporations. In particular, they seek to guarantee more
stable and long-term contractual arrangements for greater predictability, to safeguard
intellectual property to avoid unintended transfer of expertise, and to integrate protec-
tive mechanisms to prevent potential future crowding-out competition.
Such balanced agreements between South African market access and BRIC partners’
‘resource seeking’ or ‘market seeking’ interests were accomplished through a strategic
equity partnership with a Chinese funder and oﬀ-taker in Case One, a strategic market-
ing joint venture with a Brazilian multinational company in Case Two, forms of supply-
chain collaboration in Case Three, and buyer–supplier agreements with players from
each of the BRICS partners in the remaining three cases. There was a notable joint
manufacturing venture with an Indian components manufacturer and supplier in Case
Six. A majority of the executive teams from the multiple-case study opted to pursue
development ﬁnancing provided by non-South African BRICS players secured through
oﬀ-take agreements.
The experiences that facilitated competitive growth of their own power base created
a broader way forward. In Case Two, it involved assessing resource endowment,
completing feasibility studies and organising potential partnership deals with a partner
who would take ‘control of the production operation’. Identifying a ‘beauty queen’ out
of 40 world leading mining companies implies a high level of self-perception. An
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opportunistic drive to ﬁnd the perfect ﬁt with respect to non-core competencies is also
perceptible. The respondent revealed that the process of ‘getting to know the other
party [. . .] either building or destroying trust’ involved a contingent process of learning
and experimenting. It meant engaging with the world’s largest iron ore producer, in fact
a competitor in one of the company’s core products. Therefore, opportunism in
learning how to engage with giants is particularly salient.
Personality and personal commitment were essential in the transaction and the
subsequent formation of a marketing joint venture with the Brazilian multinational
company in daily operations and at all business levels. It was also a learning process
involving taking a risk and articulating and balancing diﬀerent imperatives due to the
diﬀerent business cultures:
(. . .) there was a lot of trust built up in the process which lasted also until afterwards. There
was a lot of transparency between us, also about their business – where they were going
and what opportunities they saw for us. The communication was very good indeed. They
said the communication was very, very good! However I have to say that this is personality
driven! (Director, Case Two mining company, Johannesburg, Personal communication,
April 2013).
In Case Two, arranging mutual transparency and openness in communication at the
top level and sharing entrepreneurial rationale and information on African opportu-
nities ranked very high. Successful South African teams that were studied needed to be
able to compensate for lack of ﬁnancial capacity in the new arrangements and where
there were conﬂicts of interest. They compensated through their practical understand-
ing of how to provide the required technology and product or service quality, local
market intelligence, and mastery of ventures in Africa that are often vulnerable to high
costs due to unpredictability and risk.
South African business interviewees shared concerns over the domestic economic
environment in South Africa characterised by infrastructural and bureaucratic chal-
lenges (Grant Makokera, Chapman, and Wentworth 2012; Mohamed 2013):
‘. . .It is not easy for foreign investors to come to South Africa. There is a lot of time-
consuming administration and bureaucracy, and it is really diﬃcult to do business here’
(Senior executive, Case Six manufacturing company, Johannesburg, March 2013).
Consequently, reliable contracts with South African service providers could be
critical for investors from other BRIC members as they were for Western investors.
Here, South African companies’ agency is manifest in service provision niches. The
EPCM provider (Case Four), the OEM (Case Five) and the components manufacturer
(Case Six) all exempliﬁed situations that demanded more than straightforward technol-
ogy transfer and required establishing incentives for the creation of tightly-knit partner-
ships. Best quality of service provision could then become the basis for obtaining
signiﬁcant product orders from international clients (Wenzel 2016).
Disadvantageous power relations can be turned into strengths. Successful teams
learnt not only to turn adversity into opportunity but also how to demonstrate their
strengths through ﬂexible problem solving with their BRIC partners. Such teams
constantly attempted to become facilitators and key stakeholders in new economic
linkages with both customers and suppliers. Consequently, shifts in meaning making
(e.g. self-perception; cognitive frames of competition and collaboration; market
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intelligence) have shifted attitudes from a defeatist retreat from rivalry to a sense of
achievement in an entrepreneurial spirit of ‘getting things done.’ Again, the need and
the willingness to carry out appropriate entrepreneurial practices and types of agency
(e.g. strategic, collaborative, opportunistic) were evident in executive teams’ continual
search for successful collaboration strategies. These involved ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm economic
diplomacy that resulted in agreements on proﬁtable long-term arrangements.
3.5. Joint investment in international infrastructure
Interviews, group discussions, conversations, and observations of phone calls or meet-
ings involving the relatively small minerals logistics provider (Case Three) oﬀered
evidence of a growing relationship with a much larger Chinese partner. The partner
would ﬁnancially support the so-called north–south rail corridor linking Maputo
(Mozambique), Pretoria and Durban. There is a need to connect the Indian Ocean
ports better to deal with bulk transport and ﬁll the empty coal trains coming back from
Maputo into South Africa. The planned expansion of Maputo’s Matola Coal Terminal,
which is already the main gateway from South Africa for Indian coal importers
(Director, Case Three, Johannesburg, April 2013) would play a key role here .
Consequently, new arrangements could aim at jointly creating anchor connections
linked to the rail system and thereby reduce transport time cycles from pit to port.
The opportunities that emerged were both practical and visionary. Case Three
developed a business model out of a clear vision, which is characteristic of what we
shall call the conductor type of agency. As a result, Chinese importers of chrome and
manganese began to invest in the expansion and advancement of rail facilities as well as
adjacent warehouses. Feasibility studies were also carried out for smaller joint ventures
for investing capital and expertise in the construction of short private railway lines to
connect some black-owned mines to the main routes. These mine owners struggle with
high ﬁxed costs during low price phases. Their only opportunity for reducing costs and
continuing production lies in attracting FDI from end-users. This necessitated the
instruments required to spark oﬀ long-term contract commitments. This could be
described as ring-fencing and going against the conventional ﬂow of supply and
demand.
On a ring-fence model with somebody, it can be the lowest cost model, with lowest
margins, so that it is sustainable. You ring-fence it with the furnace on the other side in
China, and you ring-fence it with the supplier. It is a common model, but I think what we
have done is we have forced the model for our own purposes. If you really want sustain-
ability, we get CU1 to sell it to the guys [Chinese steel mills]. CU1 will do a deal with the
ﬁnance and ring-fence (Director, Case Three minerals logistics company, Johannesburg,
Personal communication, April 2013).
Such practices have consequences beyond the micro level of inter-organisational
exchanges and collaboration. The associated companies claim to have achieved a shift
in the commodity export process from ecologically damaging and costly road transport
to cheaper rail transport. Accomplishing this shift requires a niche strategy that calls for
skilful balancing through collaboration despite potentially contrasting aspirations. The
conductor’s strengths lie in considering and proactively experimenting with diverse
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stakeholders’ imperatives. Succeeding involves mastering tough learning processes that
overcome conventional operational hierarchies. Novel but simple tools have to be
found.
Organising what appears to be ‘simplicity’ and providing eﬀective proximity were
tools that allowed minerals suppliers and end users to interact in what Fligstein (2001)
has termed ‘conceptions of control’. He considers these to be powerful cognitive
mechanisms that justify particular activities. Appropriating these conceptions to custo-
mers’ needs then becomes the basis for spreading contractual and physical anchor
connections. In this case, new contracts and rail sidings were supposed to be organised.
An entrepreneurial and innovative focus on outcome became essential in settling on a
ﬁxed investment. It was also based on the development of relationships sustained
through a degree of aﬀection and ambition as well as a will to advance to new
entrepreneurial practices of problem solving, and a visionary approach towards an
unrealised reality. This also required continuous attention to external macro stimuli.
These sustained the conductors’ determination to broker an agreement, and the learn-
ing process of facilitating new social and material linkages supported the activity. At the
micro-level, these linkages also help to ‘shift minerals cargo from road to rail’ and thus
provide greater predictability to the supply chain niche ﬁrm.
4. Conclusion
South African companies in the 2010s have accomplished substantial goals from their
revised corporate development strategies in the BRICS context including constructing
new mines, growing new markets for existing products and services, achieving proxi-
mity and customer loyalty in new locations, exploring future market potential of such
locations, developing and strengthening after-sales services in new markets, and creat-
ing cost synergies to compete internationally more eﬀectively. For instance, oﬀ-take
agreements as well as competitively secured Chinese funding ensured the survival and
proﬁtability of new and current mining projects, thus stabilising employment despite
recent sweeping retrenchments in platinum mining elsewhere.
Ethnographic research is suitable for exploring and understanding what triggers trial
and error methods, unlearning the past, and observing how learning to revise entre-
preneurial practices can generate higher predictability in supply or demand.
Predictability can no longer be based on the structural bureaucratic features of organi-
sations as outlined by Chandler (1977). The empirical evidence presented here results
from a qualitative approach using diﬀerent methods and emerged from a small sample
of South African ﬁrms. Findings cannot necessarily be generalised to the broader
population of private or listed companies. However, they are potentially indicative of
how decision-makers perform in the present uncertain economic environment.
Drawing from a larger study, this paper has suggested three distinct types based on
varied conditions that generate competitive agency. Each of them creates (social) value
from negotiating, investing in, and in particular, practicing signiﬁcant inter-organisa-
tional arrangements. They all hinge on the diﬃcult process of constructing socio-
technical linkages and proﬁtable relationships that have become essential for success.
Competitive agency is created through contextual conditions, subjective reﬂexivity, as
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well as ongoing practices and arrangements. It means taking on target-oriented capacity
to generate desired eﬀects in an uncertain environment.
The empirical evidence found in the study conﬁrms the need to advance the theoretical
understanding of agency, and thereby, the analytical power of the concept. Competitive
agency, in its narrowest sense, permits executive teams to proﬁtably create and distribute
value-added commodities, products and services. In its wider sense, it actualises value for the
enterprise, its stakeholders, and the society. Entrepreneurial methods can fortify competitive
agency to negotiate interests and to overcome perceived impediments to growing business
proactively. Organisational entrepreneurship is thus (re)deﬁned as a proactive method of
human problem-solving and a practical form of organising human and material arrange-
ments (Hjorth 2012; Sarasvathy and Venkataraman 2011). Reﬂexive searching, investing into
and accomplishing new arrangements can generate the creative power to turn competitive
agency and the new diversiﬁed linkages it creates into value for the South African players.
Ethnographic research allows one to trace the diﬀerent capacities appropriate for
distinct types of agency. African agents have real strengths. Often, they are too superﬁcially
characterised as subordinate, dominated or marginal. They can distinguish between
tolerating or adapting to dominance, ﬁnding new combinations of engagement, resisting,
and changing situations, or even exercising dominance in certain areas. This has been
characterised through examining meso-level social orders, which reside at every level of
both collective and individual interactions (Fligstein and Vandebroeck 2014).
We suggest here that entrepreneurship should be deﬁned in a way that explores
teams’ entrepreneurial activities rather than the traits of individuals. Such activities may
best be deﬁned as forging a node in a gateway between South Africa and BRIC
countries. Successful companies can also shape the gateway physically and through
human linkages. South Africa, therefore, has the potential to reap the beneﬁts, political
and otherwise, of such a gateway function as well as securing seriously needed employ-
ment in an age of global economic volatility.
Notes
1. The multiple-case study purposely focussed on managers and oﬃcials. These included
individuals with the job title Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO); Managing Director (MD),
Chief Operating Oﬃcer, Chief Financial Oﬃcer (CFO); Director of Corporate Aﬀairs, or
Director of Corporate Development. All participants in the research act as members of the
executive teams with their very diverse styles of leading their businesses in a dynamic
environment. Executive teams normally operate one level below the board but in small
companies, they act as members of the board.
2. India is not listed in Table Three as it ranks as a relatively minor producer: India’s gold
production was estimated to be 1.6 metric tons in 2017 (2.2 in 2012), while its estimated
gold reserves stood at 557.8 metric tons in 2017.
3. China also absorbed more than 60% of the world’s traded iron ore, the fourth biggest
commodity on sale from South Africa (Baxter 2016).
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